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Abstract
Purpose – Natural disasters may inflict significant damage upon international financial markets. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate if any contagion effect occurred in the immediate  
aftermath of the Japanese earthquake, tsunami and nuclear crisis. 
Design/methodology/approach – Using 33 international stock indexes and exchange rates, this 
paper  uses   heteroscedasticity  biases  based  on  correlation  coefficients  to  examine  if  any 
contagion  occurred  across  financial  markets  after  the  March  11,  2011  Japanese  earthquake, 
tsunami and nuclear crisis. The sample period is partitioned into two sections: the 12-month pre-
earthquake period (March 11, 2010 to March 10, 2011) and the 2-month post-earthquake period 
(March 11, 2011 to May 10, 2011).  While the stability period is defined as the pre-earthquake 
period, the turbulent (turmoil) period is defined as the post-earthquake period. In a bid to ensure 
robustness of our findings, the turmoil period is further partitioned into two equal sections: the 1-
month (short-term) post-earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to April 10, 2011), and the 2-month 
(medium-term) post-earthquake (March 11, 2011 to May 10, 2011). 
Findings –  Findings  reveal  that,  while  no  sampled  foreign  exchange  market  suffered  from 
contagion,  stock  markets  of  Taiwan,  Bahrain,  Saudi  Arabia  and  South  Africa  witnessed  a 
contagion effect.
Research limitations – From a broad perspective, the phenomenon of contagion could be seen 
as the general process of shock transmission across countries. This definition takes account of 
both negative and positive spillovers. However,  the Forbes and Rigobon(2002) methodology for 
contagion is relevant only for negative spillovers.
Practical  implications –  Our  results  have  two  paramount  implications.  Firstly,  we  have 
confirmed existing consensus that in the face of natural crises that could take an international 
scale,  emerging markets  are contagiously affected for the most part.  Secondly,  we have also 
shown that international financial market transmissions not only occur during financial crisis; 
natural disaster effects should not be undermined.
Originality/value  – This paper has shown that the correlation structure of international financial 
markets also depend on high profile natural disasters. 
JEL Classification: G10; G15; F30
Keywords: Japanese Earthquake; Contagion; International Financial Markets
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1. Motivation
Natural disasters have inflicted serious damages on human life, property and economy. 
Though many earthquakes occur worldwide on an annual basis and could impair all walks of life  
in one way or the other, collateral effects resulting from such natural stalemates could be quite 
detrimental financially and economically. The recent Japanese earthquake has resulted in many 
such collateral damages that make the disaster particularly significant. On March 11 2011, a 9.0 
magnitude undersea mega thrust earthquake hit Tohoku in Japan. This powerful shock triggered 
a Tsunami that struck coastlines  across the east  of the country,  leaving thousands death and 
damaging considerable property. But what appears to have left analysts startled and concerned 
over the consequences of this earthquake is the nuclear disaster resulting there-from. Recently 
classified as a level-seven event on the International Nuclear Event Scale, the Fukushima nuclear 
incident  now  poses  a  risk  equated  to  the  worst  nuclear  power  plant  accident  in  history 
(Chernobyl  disaster).  With  much  uncertainty  over  how  the  crisis  would  be  managed,  it  is 
imperative to investigate how international financial markets have so far reacted. 
Therefore the goal of this paper is to examine whether any contagion effect has occurred 
two months after the Japanese earthquake, tsunami and worst nuclear crisis since the Chernobyl. 
In other words, we seek to provide evidence as to whether such a disaster has increased the 
interdependence among financial  assets  in different  countries.  The remainder  of the paper is 
organized as follows. Sections 2 examines related literature. Data and methodology are presented 
and outlined respectively in Section 3. Empirical analysis is covered in Section 4. We discuss 
results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Related literature
2.1 Effects of financial market integration
Financial  integration  is  widely believed  to  improve  capital  allocation   efficiency and 
diversify risks (Demyanyk and Volosovych, 2008; Coulibaly, 2009; Kose et al., 2011). However, 
the recent global financial crisis deemed as the worst since the Great Depression has left many 
analysts concerned about the contagious effects of financial globalization. Though countries in 
relative financial autarky are almost immune to global financial shocks, they may well fail to 
reap  the  benefits  of  financial  globalization  which  far  outweigh  negative  feedbacks  from 
contagion. A great chunk of literature has been dedicated to the potential benefits of financial 
integration. 
With  respect  to  Kose  et  al.  (2011),  financial  globalization  in  theory should  facilitate 
efficient allocation of capital and improve international risks sharing. They further profess that 
benefits are much greater for developing countries because they are relatively scare in capital 
and rich in labor availability. According to them, access to foreign capital should enable them 
grow faster via new sources of investment. On a positive note of financial globalization, they 
stress that since developing countries have more volatile output growth than advanced industrial 
economies, their potential welfare gains from international risk sharing are much greater.  It is 
important  to  underline  an  important  finding of  theirs:  with  certain  identifiable  thresholds  in 
variables  such  as  financial  depth  and  institutional  quality,  the  cost-benefit  trade-off  from 
financial openness improves significantly once the threshold conditions are met. Much earlier 
Demyanyk and Volosovych (2008) had analyzed the benefits of financial integration resulting 
from international  risk sharing  among  25 European  Union (EU)  countries.  In  their  case  for 
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diversification of risk across EU member states, they posit that if risks are fully shared, the 10 
new members joining the EU should have higher gains than the long standing 15 members. It 
may be interesting to note South Africa as one of the most striking indications of the  cost and 
benefits  of  financial  integration.  As a  country  that  experienced  financial  autarky due  to  the 
embargo imposed in 1985 and removed in 1993, Coulibaly (2009) found a significant decrease in 
the  rates  of  investment,  capital  and  output  during  the  embargo  period  as  compared  to  pre-
embargo and post-embargo periods. By the same token South Africa might have been immune to 
contagion from a global financial meltdown during the embargo period. 
It  follows that,  countries in relative financial  autarky as less exposed to international 
shocks. While the prime advantage of financial integration is risk diversification, paradoxically 
increased  financial  globalization  can  reduce  the  scope  for  risk  diversification  as  integrated 
markets tend to be more correlated and highly interdependent. On another negative note Kose et 
al. (2011)  stress that  a country may stand to reap the benefits of financial integration if certain 
threshold factors like financial depth and institutional quality are met. This stance is shared by 
Schmukler  (2004)  who  has  underlined  the  importance  of  sound  financial  fundamentals  and 
strong macroeconomic institutions; the absence of which will decrease the effectiveness of crises 
management and increase the probability of crises and contagion. 
2.2 Linkages among natural disasters, globalization and crises
In the first part of this literature review, we have presented several benefits of financial 
integration as well as potential dismays. As such , occurrences or crisis in one country often due 
to domestic factors (human or natural) could be propagated to other countries through channels 
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of globalization(trade  or  financial  links  for  instance).  There  are  four  main  routes  via  which 
natural disasters like the Japanese turmoil could lead to crises at a global level.
 On a first count, as stressed by Schmukler (2004), when a country’s financial system is 
liberalized, it becomes an object of market discipline exercised by both foreign and domestic 
investors. As such reactions to unsound fundamentals resulting from natural disasters are not 
only the concern of domestic investors as in closed economies. If the prospects of resolving the 
disaster are blur, asymmetric information would lead investors to take irrational decisions that 
could result in some crisis of global profile depending on the degree of financial integration.
 On a second note, international financial market imperfections could arise from a natural 
disaster,  especially  herding  behavior,  speculative  attacks,  irrational  responses...etc.  Thus 
regardless of market fundamentals, investors could speculate against a currency in a wake of a 
natural calamity if they deem the exchange rate unsustainable, which could lead to self-fulfilling 
balance-of-payments. This thesis presented by Obstfeld (1986) has been supported by Schmukler 
(2004) and more recently Asongu (2011a,b). 
Thirdly, even in the presence of sound fundamentals and absence of imperfections in the 
international  capital  market  (after  a  natural  disaster),  crises  might  crop-up  due  to  external 
factors(Schmukler, 2004) such as determinants of capital flows(Calvo et al., 1996) and foreign 
interest rates(Frankel and Rose, 1996). For example, if the country is foreign capital dependent, 
shifts  in  foreign  capital  after  a  natural  calamity  could  create  financial  issues  and economic 
downturns.  As pointed out by Frankel  and Rose (1996),  foreign interest  rates could play an 
important role in determining the likelihood of financial crises in developing countries.
Last but not the least, according to Schmukler (2004) natural disasters through financial 
globalization could lead to crisis by contagion, notably through shocks by real links, financial 
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links  and  herding  behavior  or  unexplained  high  correlations.  Our  focus  on  this  Japanese 
earthquake will rotate around this fourth example; the definition and elucidation of which are 
worthwhile.  
2.3 Definitions and channels of contagion
2.3.1 Definitions of contagion
There  is  yet  no  established  consensus  on  the  definition  of  contagion  by economists. 
However according to the World Bank there are three main definitions of contagion. Firstly, 
from  a  broad  prism  the  phenomenon  could  be  seen  with  the  general  process  of  shock 
transmission  across  countries.  This  definition  takes  account  of  both  negative  and  positive 
spillovers. Secondly, contagion could be synonymous to the propagation of shocks between two 
countries  in  excess  of  what  should  be  expected  with  respect  to  existing  fundamentals  after 
considering co-movements  triggered by common shocks.  This second definition  is  somehow 
restrictive as it presupposes the mastery of what constitute the underlying fundamentals, without 
which  an  assessment  of  excess  co-movements  is  impossible.  The third  and more  restrictive 
definition  considers  the  phenomenon  as  the  change  in  transmission  mechanisms  that  occur 
during the crisis period and it is assessed by a significant increase in cross-market correlations. 
With respect to this study, we shall limit ourselves to the third definition of contagion 
because: (1) our study aims to investigate only a crisis-period in the Japanese financial market 
(as opposed to the first definition); and (2) we have no mastery of what constitute underlying  
fundamentals  of  co-movements  we  are  about  to  investigate  (in  antagonism  to  the  second 
definition). 
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From an empirical standpoint, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) first proposed a methodology 
for the third definition. They view contagion as a significant increase in market co-movements 
after a shock has occurred in one country. Owing to this conception, the condition for contagion 
is a significant increase in co-movements as a result of a shock in one market(considered the 
base criterion). It follows that if two markets display a high degree of co-movement during the 
stability period, even if they are highly correlated during a crisis, if the difference in correlation 
is insignificant,  contagion has not occurred.  Thus in the absence of a significant  increase in 
correlation  during  the  crisis  period,  the  term ‘interdependence’  is  employed  to  appraise  the 
situation between the two markets.  
2.3.2 Channels of contagion
In  accordance  with  Schmukler  (2004),  three  main  channels  of  contagion  have  been 
identified  in the literature.  (1) Through real  links which are often tied to  trade links.  As an 
example,  if  we consider  two countries  trading together  and competing  in  the  same external 
market,  a  devaluation  of  the  exchange  rate  of  one  country  diminishes  the  other  country’s 
competitive advantage. In an attempt to rebalance its external sectors, the losing country would 
seek to depreciate/devaluate its own currency. (2) Via financial channels especially when two 
economies are connected through the international financial system. If we consider a leverage 
institution facing margin calls as an example, if the value of the collateral falls due to a negative  
shock in a given country, the institution would be poised to sell some of its holdings in countries 
not yet affected by the shock in an attempt to increase its initial stock. This response may give 
rise to ripples of shocks that could engender contagion. (3) Lastly, as a result of herding behavior 
or  panics  resulting  from asymmetric  information,  a  financial  market  might  transmit  shocks 
across other markets. 
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2.4 Measuring  contagion 
Quite  a  number  of  methods  have  been  suggested  in  the  literature  for  measuring  the 
spreading of international shocks across countries. Among these,  the most  widely applied are 
cross-market correlation coefficient measures (Lee et al., 2007; Collins and Biekpe, 2003; Forbes 
and  Rigobon,  2002;  King  and  Wadhwani,  1990),  volatility  analysis  based  on  ARCH  and 
GARCH models (King et al.,  1994), cross-market co-integration vectors changing techniques 
(Kanas, 1998) and direct estimation of specific transmission mechanisms(Forbes, 2000). Within 
the framework of this study, we shall adopt Forbes and Rigobon (2002) in the context of Lee et 
al. (2007). 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data
As we have earlier emphasized, we aim to investigate the correlations between returns of 
the  Japanese  daily  stock  index  (exchange  rate)  and  33  other  international  stock  indexes 
(exchange rates) returns. Adopting the Japanese equity and foreign exchange markets as the base 
criterion, we investigate if co-movements among national stock and foreign exchange markets 
increased significantly after  the major  earthquake,  tsunami  and nuclear  disaster.  The sample 
period is partitioned into two sections: the 12-month pre-earthquake period (March 11, 2010 to 
March 10, 2011) and the 2-month post-earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to May 10, 2011)1. 
While the stability period is defined as the pre-earthquake period, the turbulent (turmoil) period 
is defined as the post-earthquake period. In a bid to ensure robustness of our findings, the turmoil 
1 Differences in pre-earthquake and post-earthquake sample periods are in line with Collins and Biekpe (2003); Lee  
et al.(2007) and Asongu(2011ab). 
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period is further partitioned into two equal sections: the 1-month (short-term) post-earthquake 
period (March 11, 2011 to April 10, 2011), and the 2-month (medium-term) post-earthquake 
(March 11, 2011 to May 10, 2011). The number of days are respectively 365, 31, 62 days for the 
stable, short-term turmoil and medium-term turmoil periods.  Data used in the study is obtained 
from Bloomberg’s database. In the computation of stock returns, last values are carried over for 
non-trading days. The US dollar is used as the common “x” unit of foreign currency for each unit 
of  national/regional  currency in  the  computation  of  exchange  rate  returns.  Our  use  of  local 
currency index return is in line with Forbes and Rigobon (2002) who have shown that using 
dollar or local indices will produce similar results.
3.2 Methodology 
Borrowing from Forbes and Rigobon (2002), contagion is a significant increase in market 
co-movements after a shock has occurred in one country. 
The coefficient of correlation is defined as: 
yx
xy
σσ
σ
ρ =                                                                                                   (1)
Where:  ‘x’  represents  the  base  criterion  and  ‘y’  an  international  market.   This  correlation 
coefficient is adjusted in the following manner to take account of heteroscedasticity: 
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It measures the change in high-period volatility against volatility in the low-period. While the 
crisis interval is used as the high volatility period, the tranquil or stable-period represents the low 
volatility  period.  Contagion  is  eventually  measured  as  the  significant  increase  of  adjusted 
correlation coefficients in time-varying turmoil periods against the stability period.  
Borrowing from Lee et al (2007), the following hypotheses are tested: 
0: ≤− stoH ρρ  versus 0:1 >− stH ρρ
Where,  ρt is the adjusted correlation coefficient during the turmoil period and  ρs the adjusted 
correlation  coefficient  for  the  stable  period. A  comparison  of  the  difference  in  correlation 
between  the  stable  and  crisis  periods  is  then  carried-out.  The  null  hypothesis  (H0)  is  the 
hypothesis of no contagion while H1 is the alternative hypothesis for the presence of contagion. 
Fisher’s Z transformations of correlation coefficients are used to test pair-wise cross-country 
significance.   This  Fisher’s  Z-transformations  change  standard  coefficients  to  normally 
distributed Z variables. Therefore, before hypothesis testing,  ρ values must be converted to Zr 
values. 
0: ≤− stoH ρρ   ⇒ 0: ≤− rsrto ZZH  
0:1 >− stH ρρ   ⇒ 0:1 >− rsrt ZZH
Where:
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4. Empirical Results
4.1 Contagion effect in international stock indexes returns after earthquake 
Table 1 shows the conditional (unadjusted) correlation coefficients of international stock 
indexes for the 2011 Japanese Tsunami.  Cross-market correlations of stock index returns are 
compared before and after the earthquake of March 11, 2011. With the exceptions of China, 
Taiwan, New Zealand, Argentina, Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and South Africa; cross-market 
correlations between Japan and most countries in the sample during stable period are higher than 
those  during  medium-term  turmoil  period.  For  the  short-run  interval,  correlations  are 
strengthened for China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, 
Germany, Bahrain, South Africa and Saudi Arabia. There is significant evidence of contagion in 
Taiwan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and South Africa for the short-term turmoil period and only in 
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia for the medium-term turmoil interval. Comparatively,  for the most 
part volatilities of most countries during the stable period are higher than those during turmoil 
periods (short and medium terms). 
Unconditional  correlation  coefficients  are  presented  in  Table  2.  These  adjusted 
correlations  are  higher  that  their  unadjusted counterparts  in  table  1.   Results  of Table 1 are 
substantiated by those of Table 2.  
4.2 Contagion effect in international exchange rates returns after earthquake
Findings  in  Table  3  present  exchange  rate  conditional  (unadjusted)  correlation 
coefficients. Cross-market correlations during turmoil periods are higher than those during the 
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stable period. Strengthened cross-markets correlations with insignificant evidence of contagion 
are noticeable for Thai Baht (THB), Argentinian Peso (ARS), Egyptian Pound (EGP), and Qatari  
Riyal (QAR) for the short-term turmoil period. With regard to the medium-term, the Chinese 
Yuan (RMB), Canadian Dollar (CAD), Egyptian pound (EGP), Qatari Riyal (QAR) and Emirati 
dirham (AED) also witnessed insignificant stronger co-movements with the Japanese Yen (JPY). 
Adjusted  results  from Table  4  confirm those  in  Table  3.  In  summary,  no  national/regional 
exchange market is found to have suffered from contagion two months in the aftermath of the 
Japanese earthquake and ensuing collateral disasters. 
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Table 1: International stock indexes returns conditional (unadjusted) correlation coefficients in 2011 Japanese earthquake
Regions Countries
Full period Stable Period Short-term turmoil period Medium-term turmoil period
    ρ     σ     ρ     σ     ρ     σ Z-test Co     ρ     σ Z-test Co
South Asia
and South-
East Asia
India 0.288 0.009 0.343 0.009 0.247 0.009 -0.538 N 0.171 0.009 -1.321 N
Malaysia 0.372 0.005 0.405 0.005 0.392 0.005 -0.080 N 0.348 0.005 -0.474 N
Philippines 0.317 0.009 0.357 0.009 0.295 0.009 -0.353 N 0.266 0.008 -0.715 N
Singapore n.a 0.000 n.a 0.000 n.a 0.000 n.a n.a n.a 0.000 n.a n.a
Thailand 0.308 0.009 0.361 0.010 0.278 0.008 -0.470 N 0.209 0.008 -1.180 N
East Asia 
and North-
East Asia
China 0.283 0.011 0.309 0.012 0.477 0.007 1.022 N 0.321 0.007 0.100 N
Hong  Kong 0.510 0.009 0.542 0.009 0.574 0.009 0.240 N 0.525 0.008 -0.166 N
Taiwan 0.587 0.008 0.591 0.008 0.781 0.008 1.881* Y 0.694 0.008 1.247 N
South Korea 0.575 0.008 0.606 0.008 0.660 0.008 0.458 N 0.566 0.008 -0.437 N
Australasia Australia -0.004 0.008 0.000 0.008 0.073 0.007 0.373 N -0.021 0.007 -0.147 N
New Zealand 0.440 0.004 0.459 0.004 0.609 0.004 1.080 N 0.515 0.004 0.525 N
North 
America
Canada -0.055 0.197 -0.013 0.208 -0.441 0.125 -2.348 N -0.343 0.110 -2.455 N
U.S.A 0.176 0.012 0.217 0.013 0.054 0.008 -0.848 N 0.074 0.007 -1.041 N
Mexico 0.159 0.007 0.208 0.007 0.048 0.006 -0.831 N 0.027 0.006 -1.310 N
South 
America 
Argentina 0.174 0.012 0.163 0.013 0.312 0.011 0.807 N 0.269 0.010 0.795 N
Brazil 0.076 0.010 0.120 0.010 -0.033 0.006 -0.783 N -0.069 0.008 -1.351 N
Chile 0.117 0.007 0.178 0.007 -0.086 0.008 -1.357 N -0.035 0.007 -1.532 N
Europe
France 0.321 0.012 0.366 0.012 0.253 0.011 -0.639 N 0.254 0.010 -0.883 N
Poland 0.218 0.008 0.287 0.008 -0.045 0.006 -1.735 N 0.013 0.006 -2.014 N
Germany 0.325 0.009 0.366 0.009 0.350 0.012 0.083 N 0.334 0.011 -0.012 N
Italy 0.248 0.013 0.292 0.013 0.142 0.009 -0.806 N 0.169 0.009 -0.928 N
Holland 0.332 0.010 0.378 0.010 0.296 0.008 -0.473 N 0.271 0.008 -0.851 N
Spain 0.193 0.015 0.255 0.016 -0.116 0.009 -1.923 N -0.001 0.009 -1.860 N
U.K 0.292 0.009 0.361 0.009 0.135 0.008 -1.234 N 0.129 0.008 -1.764 N
Middle 
East and 
Africa
Bahrain 0.006 0.005 -0.050 0.005 0.290 0.006 1.774* Y 0.207 0.005 1.850* Y
Egypt 0.116 0.013 0.104 0.011 0.098 0.028 -0.027 N 0.131 0.022 0.198 N
Jordan -0.035 0.005 -0.020 0.005 -0.101 0.006 -0.413 N -0.097 0.005 -0.554 N
Kuwait -0.073 0.005 -0.026 0.005 -0.298 0.006 -1.431 N -0.256 0.004 -1.679 N
Qatar 0.019 0.009 0.046 0.009 -0.080 0.009 -0.641 N -0.064 0.008 -0.785 N
Saudi Arabia 0.182 0.011 0.117 0.011 0.493 0.013 2.154** Y 0.457 0.010 2.678*** Y
UAE 0.080 0.006 0.109 0.006 -0.055 0.006 -0.836 N 0.010 0.005 -0.706 N
South  Africa 0.348 0.009 0.343 0.009 0.634 0.008 1.994** Y 0.434 0.009 0.766 N
Other Russia 0.290 0.012 0.378 0.012 0.007 0.010 -1.992 N 0.069 0.012 -2.338 N
Note 1: *, **, ***: statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Note 2: The table shows conditional (unadjusted) cross-market correlation coefficients (ρ) and standard deviations (σ) for Japan and other stock indexes. The test statistics are obtained from Fisher Z  
transformations. The stable period is defined as the 12-month pre-earthquake period (March 11, 2010 to March 10, 2011). The short-term turmoil period is defined as the 1-month post-earthquake period 
(March 11, 2011 to April 10, 2011). The medium-term turmoil period is defined as the 2-month post-earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to May 10, 2011). The full period is the stable period plus the  
medium-term turmoil period. Co: contagion .While “Y” denotes that the test statistics is greater than the critical value and contagion occurred, “N” indicates that the test statistics was less or equal to the  
critical value and no contagion occurred. 
Note 3: Correlation coefficients are unadjusted for heteroscedasticity. 
Table 2: International stock indexes returns unconditional (adjusted) correlation coefficients in 2011 Japanese earthquake
Regions Countries
Full period Stable Period Short-term turmoil period Medium-term turmoil period
      ρ     σ     ρ*stp   ρ*mtp       ρ*     δ Z-test Co       ρ*     δ Z-test Co
South Asia
and South-
East Asia
India 0.288 0.009 0.430 0.445 0.315 -0.017 -0.679 N 0.229 0.032 -1.745 N
Malaysia 0.372 0.005 0.500 0.516 0.485 -0.077 -0.099 N 0.451 -0.111 -0.609 N
Philippines 0.317 0.009 0.445 0.460 0.373 0.007 -0.443 N 0.351 -0.143 -0.933 N
Singapore n.a 0.000 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
Thailand 0.308 0.009 0.450 0.465 0.352 -0.165 -0.591 N 0.279 -0.155 -1.549 N
East Asia 
and North-
East Asia
China 0.283 0.011 0.389 0.403 0.577 -0.433 1.262 N 0.418 -0.387 0.130 N
Hong  Kong 0.510 0.009 0.642 0.658 0.674 0.048 0.283 N 0.642 -0.106 -0.203 N
Taiwan 0.587 0.008 0.690 0.706 0.852 0.047     2.119** Y 0.794 -0.043 1.458 N
South Korea 0.575 0.008 0.704 0.719 0.753 0.016 0.528 N 0.682 0.092 -0.523 N
Australasia Australia -0.004 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.095 -0.706 0.485 N -0.028 -0.120 -0.199 N
New Zealand 0.440 0.004 0.558 0.574 0.707 -0.119 1.283 N 0.632 -0.172 0.651 N
North 
America
Canada -0.055 0.197 -0.017 -0.018 -0.539 -0.401 -2.985 N -0.445 -0.473 -3.277 N
U.S.A 0.176 0.012 0.278 0.289 0.070 -0.410 -1.096 N 0.100 -0.458 -1.401 N
Mexico 0.159 0.007 0.267 0.278 0.063 -0.174 -1.074 N 0.037 -0.118 -1.767 N
South 
America 
Argentina 0.174 0.012 0.210 0.219 0.393 -0.139 1.029 N 0.355 -0.198 1.059 N
Brazil 0.076 0.010 0.155 0.162 -0.043 -0.381 -1.018 N -0.094 -0.228 -1.833 N
Chile 0.117 0.007 0.229 0.238 -0.112 0.215 -1.761 N -0.048 0.038 -2.073 N
Europe
France 0.321 0.012 0.456 0.471 0.322 -0.124 -0.805 N 0.336 -0.188 -1.153 N
Poland 0.218 0.008 0.364 0.377 -0.058 -0.295 -2.240 N 0.017 -0.295 -2.702 N
Germany 0.325 0.009 0.421 0.436 0.437 0.255 0.104 N 0.434 0.142 -0.015 N
Italy 0.248 0.013 0.369 0.383 0.183 -0.314 -1.032 N 0.227 -0.306 -1.232 N
Holland 0.332 0.010 0.469 0.485 0.374 -0.209 -0.593 N 0.358 -0.242 -1.108 N
Spain 0.193 0.015 0.324 0.337 -0.151 -0.406 -2.489 N -0.001 -0.443 -2.504 N
U.K 0.292 0.009 0.450 0.465 0.175 -0.152 -1.571 N 0.175 -0.120 -2.333 N
Middle 
East and 
Africa
Bahrain 0.006 0.005 -0.065 -0.067 0.367 0.022     2.290** Y 0.276 -0.156    2.501** Y
Egypt 0.116 0.013 0.134 0.140 0.127 1.605 -0.036 N 0.177 0.991 0.268 N
Jordan -0.035 0.005 -0.026 -0.027 -0.131 0.077 -0.537 N -0.132 -0.159 -0.752 N
Kuwait -0.073 0.005 -0.034 -0.036 -0.376 0.088 -1.841 N -0.339 -0.157 -2.257 N
Qatar 0.019 0.009 0.059 0.062 -0.104 0.037 -0.834 N -0.087 -0.133 -1.066 N
Saudi Arabia 0.182 0.011 0.152 0.158 0.594 0.170    2.705*** Y 0.572 -0.111  3.502*** Y
UAE 0.080 0.006 0.141 0.147 -0.071 0.012 -1.087 N 0.014 -0.085 -0.957 N
South  Africa 0.348 0.009 0.429 0.444 0.730 -0.136     2.394** Y 0.548 -0.036 0.980 N
Other Russia 0.290 0.012 0.469 0.485 0.009 -0.176 -2.550 N 0.094 -0.006 -3.100 N
Note 1: *, **, ***: statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Note 2: The table shows conditional (unadjusted) cross-market  correlation coefficients (ρ) , adjuster for heteroscedasticity (δ) and standard deviations (σ) for Japan and other stock indexes. The test 
statistics are obtained from Fisher Z transformations. The stable period is defined as the 12-month pre-earthquake period (March 11, 2010 to March 10, 2011). The short-term turmoil period is defined as  
the 1-month post-earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to April 10, 2011). The medium-term turmoil period is defined as the 2-month post-earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to May 10, 2011). The full  
period is the stable period plus the medium-term turmoil period. Co: contagion. While “Y” denotes that the test statistics is greater than the critical value and contagion occurred, “N” indicates that the  
test statistics was less or equal to the critical value and no contagion occurred. ρ*stp, ρ*mtp,  denote adjusted correlation coefficients for the short and medium term periods respectively. δ: correlation  
coefficient adjuster. 
Note 3: Correlation coefficients are adjusted for heteroscedasticity using Equation 2. 
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Table 3: International exchange rates returns conditional (unadjusted) correlation coefficients in 2011 Japanese earthquake
Regions Countries
Full period Stable Period Short-term turmoil period Medium-term turmoil period
       ρ      σ       ρ       σ          ρ      σ Z-test Co         ρ         σ     Z-test Co
South Asia
and South-
East Asia
India -0.136 0.004 -0.130 0.005 -0.282 0.002 -0.807 N -0.207 0.002 -0.560 N
Malaysia -0.197 0.004 -0.191 0.005 -0.332 0.002 -0.773 N -0.267 0.003 -0.570 N
Philippines -0.129 0.004 -0.128 0.005 -0.439 0.003 -1.746 N -0.143 0.003 -0.105 N
Singapore -0.029 0.003 -0.015 0.004 -0.197 0.003 -0.940 N -0.109 0.003 -0.674 N
Thailand 0.061 0.002 0.066 0.004 0.235 0.002 0.885 N 0.023 0.002 -0.307 N
East Asia 
and North-
East Asia
China 0.030 0.001 0.018 0.004 -0.090 0.001 -0.551 N 0.085 0.001 0.482 N
Hong  Kong -0.049 0.000 -0.020 0.004 -0.223 0.000 -1.049 N -0.225 0.000 -1.481 N
Taiwan -0.104 0.003 -0.080 0.004 -0.400 0.002 -1.748 N -0.251 0.002 -1.256 N
South Korea -0.242 0.007 -0.226 0.007 -0.500 0.005 -1.630 N -0.415 0.004 -1.508 N
Australasia Australia -0.080 0.007 -0.042 0.007 -0.428 0.006 -2.120 N -0.325 0.006 -2.099 N
New Zealand -0.031 0.007 0.035 0.007 -0.612 0.007 -3.812 N -0.419 0.006 -3.432 N
North 
America
Canada -0.272 0.006 -0.275 0.006 -0.390 0.004 -0.662 N -0.274 0.004 0.010 N
Mexico -0.338 0.005 -0.339 0.006 -0.521 0.003 -1.151 N -0.385 0.004 -0.378 N
South 
America 
Argentina -0.030 0.001 -0.026 0.001 -0.024 0.001 0.010 N -0.059 0.001 -0.237 N
Brazil -0.205 0.006 -0.181 0.006 -0.415 0.005 -1.316 N -0.356 0.006 -1.347 N
Chile 0.012 0.005 0.046 0.006 -0.281 0.004 -1.707 N -0.234 0.004 -2.028 N
Europe Euro 0.166 0.006 0.211 0.006 -0.204 0.004 -2.151 N -0.079 0.006 -2.094 N
U.K 0.043 0.005 0.073 0.005 -0.211 0.005 -1.467 N -0.147 0.004 -1.576 N
Middle 
East and 
Africa
Bahrain -0.021 0.006 -0.014 0.000 -0.029 0.000 -0.077 N -0.043 0.000 -0.208 N
Egypt 0.037 0.001 0.022 0.001 0.133 0.001 0.566 N 0.194 0.001 1.239 N
Jordan -0.026 0.001 -0.024 0.001 -0.131 0.000 -0.548 N -0.036 0.000 -0.088 N
Kuwait 0.247 0.001 0.258 0.001 0.182 0.001 -0.408 N 0.187 0.001 -0.533 N
Qatar 0.037 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.211 0.000 0.994 N 0.178 0.000 1.072 N
Saudi Arabia -0.027 0.000 0.005 0.000 -0.334 0.000 -1.795 N -0.194 0.000 -1.431 N
UAE -0.086 0.000 -0.094 0.001 -0.211 0.005 n.a n.a -0.037 0.000 0.406 N
South  Africa -0.130 0.007 -0.074 0.007 -0.601 0.007 -3.170 N -0.448 0.007 -2.906 N
Other Russia -0.140 0.004 -0.132 0.005 -0.377 0.003 -1.347 N -0.211 0.004 -0.580 N
Note 1: *, **, ***: statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. n.a: the presence of zero exchange rate return for all periods of the series. 
Note 2: The table shows conditional (unadjusted) cross-market correlation coefficients (ρ) and standard deviations (σ) for Japan and other stock indexes. The test statistics are obtained from Fisher Z  
transformations. The stable period is defined as the 12-month pre-earthquake period (March 11, 2010 to March 10, 2011). The short-term turmoil period is defined as the 1-month post-earthquake period 
(March 11, 2011 to April 10, 2011). The medium-term turmoil period is defined as the 2-month post-earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to May 10, 2011). The full period is the stable period plus the  
medium-term turmoil period. Co: contagion .While “Y” denotes that the test statistics is greater than the critical value and contagion occurred, “N” indicates that the test statistics was less or equal to the  
critical value and no contagion occurred. 
Note 3: Correlation coefficients are unadjusted for heteroscedasticity. 
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Table 4: International exchange rates returns unconditional (adjusted) correlation coefficients in 2011 Japanese earthquake
Regions Countries
Full period Stable Period Short-term turmoil period Medium-term turmoil period
    ρ      σ ρ*stp ρ*mtp        ρ*      δ Z-test Co       ρ*      δ Z-test Co
South Asia
and South-
East Asia
India -0.136 0.004 -0.181 -0.168 -0.379 -0.487 -1.104 N -0.265 -0.408 -0.721 N
Malaysia -0.197 0.004 -0.262 -0.245 -0.441 -0.510 -1.045 N -0.339 -0.356 -0.728 N
Philippines -0.129 0.004 -0.178 -0.166 -0.564 -0.267 -2.341 N -0.184 -0.281 -0.136 N
Singapore -0.029 0.003 -0.021 -0.020 -0.270 -0.154 -1.304 N -0.141 -0.088 -0.874 N
Thailand 0.061 0.002 0.092 0.086 0.320 -0.282 1.222 N 0.030 -0.194 -0.399 N
East Asia 
and North-
East Asia
China 0.030 0.001 0.024 0.023 -0.126 -0.142 -0.769 N 0.110 0.135 0.626 N
Hong  Kong -0.049 0.000 -0.029 -0.027 -0.304 0.072 -1.453 N -0.287 -0.099 -1.913 N
Taiwan -0.104 0.003 -0.112 -0.104 -0.520 -0.065 -2.367 N -0.320 -0.085 -1.617 N
South Korea -0.242 0.007 -0.308 -0.289 -0.628 -0.322 -2.138 N -0.510 -0.375 -1.892 N
Australasia Australia -0.080 0.007 -0.059 -0.055 -0.552 -0.096 -2.868 N -0.407 -0.142 -2.690 N
New Zealand -0.031 0.007 0.049 0.046 -0.734 -0.051 -5.032 N -0.515 -0.078 -4.378 N
North 
America
Canada -0.272 0.006 -0.371 -0.349 -0.509 -0.275 -0.878 N -0.347 -0.260 0.013 N
Mexico -0.338 0.005 -0.449 -0.424 -0.649 -0.407 -1.480 N -0.476 -0.350 -0.470 N
South 
America 
Argentina -0.030 0.001 -0.261 -0.033 -0.033 -0.261 0.013 N -0.077 -0.067 -0.308 N
Brazil -0.205 0.006 -0.246 -0.233 -0.537 -0.231 -1.761 N -0.444 -0.072 -1.708 N
Chile 0.012 0.005 0.064 -0.072 -0.378 -0.253 -2.359 N -0.444 -0.233 -2.622 N
Europe Euro 0.166 0.006 0.289 0.271 -0.280 -0.231 -2.983 N -0.103 -0.001 -2.712 N
U.K 0.043 0.005 0.102 0.095 -0.289 -0.074 -2.038 N -0.190 -0.150 -2.045 N
Middle 
East and 
Africa
Bahrain -0.021 0.006 -0.019 -0.018 -0.041 9.215 -0.107 N -0.056 6.189 -0.271 N
Egypt 0.037 0.001 0.031 0.029 0.184 -0.400 0.788 N 0.249 -0.496 1.603 N
Jordan -0.026 0.001 -0.034 -0.031 -0.181 -0.560 -0.763 N -0.047 -0.495 -0.114 N
Kuwait 0.247 0.001 0.349 0.328 0.250 -0.419 -0.557 N 0.240 -0.338 -0.681 N
Qatar 0.037 0.000 0.041 0.038 0.289 -0.500 1.308 N 0.229 -0.649 1.387 N
Saudi Arabia -0.027 0.000 0.006 0.006 -0.444 0.079 -2.464 N -0.249 0.025 -1.852 N
UAE -0.086 0.000 -0.131 -0.122 n.a -1.000 n.a n.a -0.048 -0.816 0.526 N
South  Africa -0.130 0.007 -0.103 -0.095 -0.725 0.003 -2.038 N -0.545 -0.041 -3.676 N
Other Russia -0.140 0.004 -0.183 -0.170 -0.494 -0.316 -1.821 N -0.270 -0.187 -0.746 N
Note 1: *, **, ***: statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Note 2: The table shows conditional (unadjusted) cross-market  correlation coefficients (ρ), adjuster for heteroscedasticity (δ) and standard deviations (σ) for Japan and other stock indexes. The test 
statistics are obtained from Fisher Z transformations. The stable period is defined as the 12-month pre-earthquake period (March 11, 2010 to March 10, 2011). The short-term turmoil period is defined as  
the 1-month post-earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to April 10, 2011). The medium-term turmoil period is defined as the 2-month post-earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to May 10, 2011). The full  
period is the stable period plus the medium-term turmoil period. Co: contagion .While “Y” denotes that the test statistics is greater than the critical value and contagion occurred, “N” indicates that the  
test statistics was less or equal to the critical value and no contagion occurred. ρ*stp, ρ*mtp, denote  adjusted correlation coefficients for the short and medium term periods respectively. δ: correlation  
coefficient adjuster. 
Note 3: Correlation coefficients are adjusted for heteroscedasticity using Equation 2.
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5. Discussion of Results
This study has investigated if the March 2011 Japanese earthquake plus resulting 
tsunami  and  nuclear  disasters  influenced  the  stability  of  the  correlation  structure  in 
international stock and foreign exchange markets.
On a first note, with respect to international stock markets there is strong evidence 
of contagion in Taiwan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and South Africa. The effect on Saudi 
Arabia is not unexpected because it is one of the four countries from which a large chunk 
of Japan’s imports in raw material originate; beside China, the U.S and Australia. For the 
other three, cross-market correlations strengthened only with China and Australia in the 
short-term, albeit insignificant to account for contagion. An explanation as to why Saudi 
Arabia was most strongly contaminated both in the immediate and medium terms could 
be grasped from Japan’s  boost  in  fuel  imports  in  substitution  to  energy provided by 
wrecked Fukushima nuclear plants. Bahrain being an oil-export driven economy like her 
sisterly neighbor Saudi Arabia could not have suffered a different fate. As for Taiwan, 
Japan is its second largest trading partner and official estimates on the effect of Japanese 
earthquake on the Taiwanese economy stand at a yearly decline in growth by 0.2% of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
Secondly, international foreign exchange market results indicate no presence of 
contagion.  Admittedly,  one would have expected  a wide spread disruption to Japan’s 
US$5.5 trillion economy to inevitably affect other countries in the Asia-Pacific region 
and beyond.  Regional  trade would have been immediately affected by the damage to 
Japanese ports.  Our unexpected  findings could be explained from the fact that  major 
Japanese  manufacturers  of  automobiles,  semiconductors,  computers  and  other  goods 
immediately took advantage of their international supply chains and production networks; 
therefore  moving  production elsewhere  in  Asia or  to  North  America,  where  capacity 
utilization is still low. Also, since Japanese factories generally produce consumer goods 
rather  than intermediate  products,  disruptions to  outbound shipments  should not have 
been expected to seriously affect production processes in other countries. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have used unadjusted and adjusted correlation coefficients to test 
for contagion effects across 33 economies in the aftermath of the Japanese earthquake, 
ensuing  tsunami  and  worst  nuclear  crisis  in  recent  history.  Results  indicate  no 
international  foreign  exchange  market  experienced  significantly  stronger  correlations 
with  the  Japanese  Yen  two  months  after.  However,  for  international  stock  markets, 
Taiwan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and South Africa experience contagion; consistent with 
the widely held notion that contagion is mostly a concern for emerging countries. 
In line with Lee et al. (2007), the effects of natural disasters on financial markets 
are  important  in  investment  decisions,  as  the  benefits  of  portfolio  diversification  are 
severely limited during periods of high volatility and increased cross-market correlations. 
With  financial  globalization,  investors  can  gain  from  diversification  if  returns  from 
financial  markets  are  stable  and  not  correlated.  However  with  volatility  spillovers, 
increase in cross-market correlations exist as a real effect and are not taken into account 
for asset allocation and portfolio composition.  
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Our results have two paramount implications. Firstly, we have confirmed existing 
consensus that in the face of natural crises that could take an international scale, only 
emerging markets are contagiously affected for the most part. Secondly,  we have also 
shown that international financial market transmissions not only occur during financial 
crises; natural disaster effects should not be undermined. 
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